

EPISTEMOLOGY OF WAR

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Abstract

War is extremely complex political and social phenomenon with knowable but, generally, hardly predictable causes and effects. Although the war is one of the most rigorous and well organized human activities, its phenomenology still stands complicated and hardly predictable, sometimes even unpredictable. But, as concerns war, although the experience is amazingly rich – maybe the best anchored in the dramatic existence of human existence -, it isn't and can't be enough to understand the essence of this phenomenon. Peculiarly today, when war – forbidden by law in its offensive, aggressive component but allowed by Article 51 of UN Chart in its defensive or dissuasive, even preemptive form – gains such forms, such contents and such connotations thus it seemed it diluted (by extension) and is about to disappear. Unfortunately, for war phenomenon it seems, the extension it isn't dilution as the delimitation isn't concentration. Thus, war phenomenon mustn't be taken out of knowledge universe and treated as a fact, as fatality or any other common things but, on the contrary, it must be took into all the components of knowledge process inclusively the ones that regard the knowledge of knowledge, as meta-knowledge.

Keywords: war, ontology, the science of human knowledge, logics, epistemology, phenomenon, essence, process, information, network

1. From the common thinking to a philosophical thinking of war

Is there a philosophy of war? In other words, is the war, as phenomenon, a product of human thinking or is a dynamic and conflicting fact of the Universe? Is it part of a modus vivendi the peoples only inherit and bring it ahead and, at most try to understand it and to adapt to its turns as much possible wishing only to survive to this devastating seism, out of Earth peoples will and conscience, or do the humans themselves create and produce it as they create, for example, the work to the lathe or the ability to climb the mountain?

The philosophy is peculiarly understood as way of thinking. More exact, as a scientific and thorough way of thinking, quibbling, going on the stream of knowledge up to its springs. It is the same science, long time experience and art of thinking, very consistent method to built the abstract, sometimes, even by the spacing or breaking

from concrete, by passing to the last level of generalization of the formalized languages toward symbols, toward a dialectics of languages world, of signifiers, signified and significances. Therefore, the philosophy is constructed by a laborious architecture of thinking. It creates and re-creates the world of thought, of abstract, of the notions and concepts, of propositions and reasoning, thus, of knowledge and, lately, of knowledge of knowledge, meaning the epistemology. In all times, it occupied the same by human's life and thoughts, by existence theory – the ontology -, by knowledge theory – human knowledge science with its branch of science knowledge or scientific knowledge called epistemology – and by thinking architecture itself – logics. The ontology, the science of human knowledge and logics are three harmonious and impressive components of philosophy which ennoble the human being by the superior quality of human thinking. The epistemology is a science of science, a meta-science, a science of the Truth.

Therefore, in the epistemological world, there aren't certitudes, there aren't axioms.

Perhaps in the Universe there exist other types of thinking and also other means to build the abstract but we, the peoples, for now, know only this, the one produced by the human thinking and that produces human thinking. The sciences close to the thinking mechanisms and human behaviour, peculiarly psychology, sociology and logics, show us greatly with the mathematics the huge dimension of human thinking, of knowledge construction.

But, as is well-known, in first, the human thinking occupies by the knowledge of its exteriority meaning the things are beyond it, concretized in objects, worlds, Universe. It is mainly presented as a way to transpose the world in notions, in concepts, in reasoning, to re-create it on its own plan, thinking plan, meaning of cognitive categories and structures, as Kant said, the most of them formalized, logical-mathematical. Consequently, it preoccupies by its own existence and functioning, it is just a thinking of thinking, knowledge of knowledge, of its intern mechanisms and processes. The operations it uses for world's knowledge – the assimilation and accommodation to, the observance and experiment, the analysis and synthesis, generalization, abstracting and concretization etc. – uses also for its own knowledge ...

Actually, this is the philosophy, with the dimensions we spoke about: ontology, the science of human knowledge, epistemology and logics.

What relation has all these with the war?

Firstly, the war as any other human activity, even presents as a fact, is and must be thought in conceptual and action plan. If “the vocation” of human societies, transposed from the Universe vocation (at least we like to believe so) is the conflict state and the war seems to be the last violent step of it, is normal for the peoples to think war, to shape it, to plan it, to build it, firstly, in conceptual plan of thinking. So, there exist a philosophy of war, as a way to think war,

which has at least four basic components: the thinking (and expertise) of political decision over the starting of war, more exact, the use of war as mean to solve a misunderstanding; the thinking of war as social complex phenomenon with dramatic and, usually, unpredictable consequences for human, the human action, for the existence and even for the knowledge; the strategic thinking of war, the operative (operational) thinking of war, of dispositions, operations and strategic military actions; the tactical thinking of war and military actions.

Still, this isn't the entire philosophy of war but only the part coming from the dynamic of the war, from its generation and justification. Consequently, there is an ontology of war – a theory of this phenomenon existence -, that anchors it in the reality of social existence theory, a human knowledge theory of war referring to the common knowledge and to the scientific knowledge of this phenomenon in historical, societal, psychological, economic, political, moral etc. context and also a logics of war. Through it, we don't understand the analysis of sufficient reasoning principle of war, neither the rationality nor ethics of war but the coherence of this concept's languages – notions, propositions, reasoning -, meaning the science to think war.

The philosophy of war takes out this phenomenon from the battle, from the brutality and lowness of primitive and incoherent violent behaviour and transforms it into a cognoscible fact, therefore, mouldable fact, submitted to some laws and norms being the basis of creation for the highest moral concepts of human behaviour: honour, dignity, courage, camaraderie, homeland, patriotism, esprit de sacrifice.

2. The knowledge of war

Thus, the knowledge of war represents a very complex, continuous and lasting process that comprises and regards all the aspects related to the philosophy, physiognomy, theory and practice of human conflict state, lead to its limit, as: the use of

weapons to solve the political misunderstandings; the analysis of causes, determinations and characteristics of the security environment, their dynamics, interactions and actions presumed by the war.

This process asks the anticipated knowledge of direct and indirect effects. Of inverse connections, concomitantly with the elaboration of some cognitive patterns, and also with the assessment and prognosis of evolutions, implications and extensions of war or its components in the physical, geophysical, real and virtual environment with their economic, social, psychological, media, cultural, informational, political and obviously military dimensions. But, it also means the knowledge of knowledge of this process, of the instruments it uses knowledge in relation to this complex and extremely dangerous phenomenon.

2.1. The common knowledge of war

War is a phenomenon in the world's sight. No matter how top secret would be the policies, strategies, forces, means and objectives aimed to be realizable or possible to be realizable by war, this phenomenon isn't understood in the process of common knowledge as a mean to unlock a strategic situation as an objective necessity but only as a mean to assert the political and economic will over a state or a group of states to enforce them to adopt a certain type of behaviour, to submit, to conquer or to assert to them a certain type of political regime. The common geo-social place of war is the bloody battle or the succession of battles which, in the end, lead to the annihilation or destruction of an army and to the victory into a single battle or along a campaign. So, the cognoscible place in the cognitive space of war is the battle of notions, propositions, reasoning, and effects in the thinking plan, in the moral plan, meaning in the knowledge plan of thought and word.

The basic entity of war – as we know it – is the army. Still, the decision of war doesn't belong to the army but to the

political leadership. In other words, the war lead by the armies is a political act and the responsibility for its starting shouldn't be born by the armies, but by the political decision-makers as a matter of fact it happens. In this vision, the armies can obtain victory but also can be defeated on the battlefield. From here is politics' job to continue the military victory (or military defeat) by other means, usually political, economic, social and administrative. There are also situations when the central entity of war isn't just the army but also the notion, the concept or the word. Here begins the cognitive war which doesn't send away the responsibility from the armies but either don't incriminate them.

In the classical war, the armies are always guilty for the lost battles. At a first representation, still the armies are guilty for the lost of war but the consequences are bear by all the structures of the defeated country or countries. The true guilt of war – if there is needed for somebody to be blamed for it – is on the political decision-maker no matter its form or formula, from conservatories to liberals, from democrats to communists.

The common knowledge of war is always simple, at level of common sense, intuitive but also superficial, affective and also taking parts. The simple person was never preoccupied by the thorough, scientific knowledge of war phenomenon.

The common sense can qualify or asses a war only from the perspective of a human opinion, of the way he represents a phenomenon that strongly overlaps human's level of representation, perception and knowledge even if the human isn't just a common person, but can be even a general. The common people and the general – although one is profane and the other higher qualified in the military art – can represent war to themselves only fragmentary. The first, the profane, believes what he sees and the specialists with high qualification doesn't believe what he sees and all he knows isn't quite enough for what means the effective and complete knowledge of war. The general's war isn't the same thing with the

phenomenon of war. For the general, the war is a calling, an act, a succession of events, of battles, where he takes part to or he leads. As social phenomenon, the war is much to complicate to be ever known at a whole, even by a general.

The causes of this “indifference” of common people but also of the specialist general, meaning of common knowledge of the war phenomenon resides in the fact that no matter what nature it has, the war has always a mysterious, ultra secret and scary feature owed to the lack of needed data and information and when they don't lack are hard to be interpreted. For the common people without a military culture neither a consistent training in the field, the fact, for example, in an operation field confronted two divisions or two armies doesn't tell him anything while he can't make a difference between division and army and can't represent to himself what does mean such confrontation into a tactical space.

The complex, interdisciplinary character of the process of war knowledge and the inaccessibility of common interdisciplinary knowledge transform this phenomenon in the knowledge plan in a phenomenon with much flexible, fluid and sometimes even impossible, paradoxical geometry.

Thus is created a niche between the common knowledge and the scientific knowledge of war which nobody hurries to avert, to cover or to exploit it. It seems all the world is content to leave it as it is because the war will always remain an extremely complex and inaccessible phenomenon for the common knowledge but not enough lobbied by the scientific knowledge because this has different problems much to appeasing than the endogen conflict state of the world.

And there's something more very important. Usually, the soldiers and the generals make the war; they are frontline peoples, the instruments or gadgets of this phenomenon. They know a part from the inner labyrinth part of war, as they can see and analyze from this dramatic interior,

although they don't have very much time for this. Therefore, they know the war only fragmentary and in a very subjective manner. From inside the woods it can't be seen the forest but only some trees.

1.2. The scientific knowledge of war

What is written in the papers or is transmitted life on the TV about the armed confrontations can be impressive because war when is publicized can be a very touching show and makes rating. But the war isn't a show. What is seen on TV isn't war transmitted life but only some humble sequences of the extremely limited view of TV camera. The commentaries did by experts or profane are also partial, subjective and convenient or interested, some very critical, some very laudatory. In fact, few peoples really know about the war phenomenon and a fortiori about the concrete war lead on the battlefield and in the operations theatres or, worse, in the knowledge plan.

But also the scientific knowledge of war, for much time, will remain partial, fragmented and disputable because the knowledge interdisciplinary and integration will always meet difficulties, when comes about war.

From here doesn't result that between war and knowledge there exist a gap very hard to be overlapped. It results only the extreme difficulty of this process and the easiness the peoples can be manipulated by the persons interested to do it.

Despite some limits hard to be overlapped, the scientific knowledge of war it also has at it turn two essential dimensions: *knowledge of theatre*, of facts and effects, of war phenomenology; *the knowledge of the structure and function of war* as instrument of politics integrated in the political and social paradigm that generated and managed it.

The war of knowledge is more then the war of knowing and the war's knowledge becomes more and more difficult. The knowing of such complex phenomenon,

dominated by ferocious policies and interests without boundaries in the space of conflict state must pass through the test of a confluence and also of some gaps between reasonable and unreasonable, between what exists and deserves to perish, between what doesn't exist but deserves to exist.

Until now, the wars were just the small visible part of the Great War of Knowledge which is lead since thousand of years in this universe-theatre, which is the Knowledge. The less safety people has in his life is distributed, more exactly, is wasted in millions and millions of small things. These call away his attention from his every step dangers which are very numerous. All, but absolutely all, threats; from the cosmic or solar radiation to the possible real or virtual criminal which waits for the total human to the one of the turns of his sinuous and intricate way through the Universe of Knowledge, as any other complex and dynamic system or as the ocean torn down by a tsunami which will come hastily over the sunny beach where, before disaster, the human felts happy. All threats and consequently offers a very little measure of security as a niche in the universe for you to shelter.

In a certain regard, we can say the war passes more and more in the information space, in the word area, in the area of knowledge. The use of knowledge as weapon isn't new. But, nowadays, it becomes a kind of super-weapon, a weapon of weapons because the last bastion of space that generates value remains the one of knowledge.

The indirect action principle developed by Liddell Hart, in his well-known paper the *Strategy of indirect actions*¹, became one of the most important principles of the present époque. Although the direct hit of the vital centres of the enemy dispositions is part of the direct strategies strongly promoted by the huge American forces and not only the manoeuvre of forces, the cyber manoeuvre, psychological manoeuvre and the media

manoeuvre (the last one passes in the frontline as the most efficient and at hand mean of war), the projection of forces, the means to accomplish the motivations, arguments and dispositions, the mean of group forces composition, the agreements signed with the host-nation, the complexity of engagement procedures, of elaborating the related national political decisions and a lot of different ways to put into practise a decision is more based on this principle that generates a complex, usually indirect, effect.

Information and military diplomacy plays an essential role in all the phases of war preparation and undergoing. Sometimes, by word it can be obtained more then by weapons. Napoleon himself, one of the greatest strategists in the world, said a newspaper can do as a thousand of bayonets.

The war isn't a world but only a system of actions, a process and by it an instrument to built or destruct in one's world space, real or imagined world, or these worlds, a phenomenon reproducing in the humans' environment which, actually, undergoes in the Universe. Also Heraclites said this, probable amazed as we are by the terrible energies of the world concentrated and broke out in wars.

The energies are, not the values. From the beginning we should say *the war doesn't lead in the space of values but in the space of interests*. The causes of wars shouldn't be looked for in value but in interests. The interests' dynamics defines the very complex dynamics of conflict state and this brought to the limit defines the war. *Thus, what connections there exist between war and value? Still, is there an axiology of war?*

Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband, as the entire school from Baden, developed a science of value – the axiology² –, that means respect of the sense of value, to legitimize the individuality.

¹ Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategia acțiunilor indirecte*, Editură Militară, București, 1993

² In the philosophy, the *axiology* appeared 1902, in the *Logics of will* paper of Paul Lapie and, in 1905, in the work of Eduard von Hartman *Grundriss der Axiologie* (actually, the word was used, bz the same author, in 1890, in *Axiology and its divisions* work (*Révue de la France et de l'étranger*, juillet-décembre, vol. XXX, pp. 466/479), <http://www.techno-science.net/?onglet=glossaire&definition=684>.

Axiology is peculiarly the science of moral values. It decomposes in two main shares: *the ethics and the aesthetics*. Apparently, these sciences can't be part of war management, and either the knowledge can't. Here we don't speak about any war but about *the cognitive war*, the war lead not only in the economic and military concepts but also in the extremely sensitive area of concepts building the axiological architecture of a nation, continent, or world.

This War of Knowledge is awful because it isn't a banal one with weapons at sight, with predictable strategies, but one infiltrating in the space of knowledge motivation destroying or asserting concepts.

Only the relation with the value allows the identification of some heterogeneous singularities in the inner space of a sensitive infinite.

All the actions related to the conflict situation, whatever are called revolutions, insurrections, riots, guerrillas, protests or war, aren't values because are actions and the actions are provoked by interests, goals and objectives accomplished by violence in the situation of war and armed conflict. The values don't fit inhere. The values are extracted from the motivation of action, are exceptionally results of actions, products accepted and recognized by humans and society which will be parts of the patrimony ennobling the action. Yet, the values aren't dogmatic even they have the quality to pass beyond time, to last in time. Without value doesn't exist lasting. And the value even can have also a dogmatic dimension isn't a dogma but special architecture perfectly moulded on the psychology and sociology of all times, on the humans' need of milestones, of stability and security. Thus, no matter we say, the value doesn't exist in either kind of conflict situation, neither is part of the weapons used on a battlefield (although some weapons as they were created can be values) and, sometimes, at its end or in its results, then and only when after rain rises the sun.

2. The epistemology and the war egress from principles

The knowledge of war as phenomenon, as experience, as fact and the knowledge of science and the art of war are two different concepts. The war science knowledge doubts the principles and analyzes the real components of this science, of the process of phenomenon's knowledge.

Actually, the epistemology means the scientific knowledge. It starts with the definition of science and continues with the identification of some methods of knowledge of science or of methods applied by science in the knowledge process. Not all the philosophers or scientists have the same opinions and the same horizons over the object and content of epistemology and peculiarly over its configuration and methodology.

Therefore, in the epistemology configuration can be identified few important trends. In the order of their apparition, these are as Martin Riopel, from Quebec University in Montreal, underlines, into an interesting study over epistemology and special role of it in the scientific education³, the followings: rationalism, empiricisms, positivism, constructivism and realism.

The rationalism is specific for the XVII century. It is an epistemological trend considering that, partial or as a whole, the valid knowledge comes from reason or with the support of reason. The main representatives of epistemological rationalism can be considered: Euclid (~300 A.D.), Pythagoras (569-475 A.D.) and Plato (428-347 A.D.), even in these times didn't exist a rationalist trend; and in the modern époque the mathematicians Descartes (1596-1650) and Leibniz (1646-1716), and also the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

The rationalist trend usually associates to the continental Europe. There exist in this trend's framework, few schools, as Platonism, that shows the inerrant harmony

³ Martin Riopel, *Epistemologie et enseignement des sciences*, Université de Québec en Montérégie, Québec, 2007. <http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r20507/epistemologie/>

of the nature that reflects into spirit and Kant criticism considering in the *Critics of Pure Reasoning*, that knowledge is a construction where the thing itself is integrated in *apriori* structures, into a system of categories,⁴ by those sensitive intuitions named by the great philosopher *space and time*. The *Critics of Pure Reasoning* is otherwise one of the main extended, intelligent and brilliant works over the knowledge of knowledge. And, even apparently, doesn't exist any connection between the war phenomenon and the efforts of rationalist philosophers to set in the rational the knowledge matter, in reality, the School from Berlin and the whole German military thinking was influenced by this trend.

The empiricism is specific to the XVIII century. In regard to this trend of XVIII century, any knowledge comes from experience. The main representatives of this trend are considered to be: Anaximene (610-545 A.D.) and, from the modern era, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the father of inductive logics, in his *Novum organum*⁵, John Locke (1632-1704) and Berkeley (1685-1753), who sustained that science progresses by the accumulation of observances and experiences. In 1686, in *Principia*, he also remarks the observation usually precedes the demonstration. These are, as we all know, methods of epistemology.

For the military thinking of the XVIII century and even of the XIX century, the empiricism was, undoubtedly, one of the stimulants of practice, of experience use to elaborate military policies and strategies. Almost the entire thinking of Napoleon and also his *Maxims* bear some of Bacon intuitionism but also of Descartes *Rules*, from the former centuries.

Actually, Napoleon thinking, the French, and also the German, school of strategy, and the nowadays American school represent sort of synthesis of esprit of those epistemological trends, synthesis found in

the new epistemology of the modern war, in the way is thought and designed, by scientific means, the knowledge and the use of this such complex and dangerous phenomenon.

The positivism is an epistemological trend specific for the XIX century. As we know, it is generally attributed to Auguste Comte (1718-1857). Along with Comte, under this trend's spirit, are also remarked in Riopel vision, but also of other historians of philosophy: Mach (1838-1916), Bridgman (1882-1961) and Bohr (1885-1962).

As the empiricism, the positivism promotes the experience, the experiment. The science becomes positive when is supported by facts, arguments, practical demonstration of hypotheses. The inductive reasoning provides the passing from the individual to general, from experience to science. The economist John Stuart Mill (1806-1837) and the geneticist Fisher (1890-1962) elaborated inductive methods based on the probabilities' calculation and statistics. But also the inductive logics contain a pure conventional part. The positivists utter the science shows as the things are and also why the things are as they are.

The distinction between the observance (as the things are) and the mathematical patterns (why the things are as they are) is very important to understand the distinction between empiricism and positivism, even in the philosophy of war. The positivists deny the scientific patterns unable to be directly observable. The Newton's infinitesimal calculations used to calculate the movement of bodies are in the positivist vision only some mathematic artifices without any value for them. The emptiness among the atoms can't exist, is preferable, in its place to be used the term of *ether*. The absolute notions of *space* and time should be measured reported to something real, material. The positivism is present even today peculiarly among the quantic physicians massively using the calculation of probabilities and statistical calculation to make the connection between observance and prediction. Certain form of positivism – let's call it the direct,

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Critica rațiunii pure*, Editura Științifică, București, 1969, pp. 41-58

⁵ Francis Bacon, *Novum organum*, Paul Carus Student Editions, 3 volume, <http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0812692454/ref>

pragmatic positivism – is present also in the military thinking framework especially in the elaboration of concepts, strategies and doctrines.

Into the positivism, are shaping few trends and the most important are:

- *the conventionalism* represented especially by *Poincaré* (1854-1912); in his regard, the hypotheses haven't cognitive value themselves;

- *the pragmatism* represented by the American *William James* (1842-1910), preceded by *Charles Pierce* (1839-1914); from this trend, latter was created the instrumentalism of *John Dewey* (1859-1952), who passes the effect before the cause; from here appeared the so-called effect-based operations;

- *the logical positivism* or *the neo-positivism* represented by *Rudolf Carnap* (1891-1970), constituted, in 1923, in the Circle from Vienna, animated by Schlick, from a group of savants and philosophers who promoted the scientific rigour excluding any metaphysical dimension; together with the Reichenbach group, constituted in Berlin, generated *the logical positivism*.

The constructivism is specific for the XX century. Protagoras (485-510 A.D.) formulated this famous sentence: *human is the measure of all things*, which can be considered as an embryo of constructivism constituted twenty centuries latter. The creator of this trend is the Dutch mathematician *Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer* (1881-1966). He used the *constructivism* term to justify its position as regards the mathematics bases different from the formalist one.

David Hilbert (1862-1943). Mathematics, in Hilbert regard, is, along with the philosophy, a science of spirit. The mathematicians who tried to answer to the question over the mathematics grounding on a single coherent and complete system is grouped in three schools: the logics school (the grounding of mathematics on sentences' logics); the formalist school (the demonstration of consistency for all the fundamental axioms of mathematics); the

constructivist school (accepts as true only the constructed issues).

Either of these schools hasn't proved very consistent. Still, *the constructivist school* was taken and continued in a certain measure by *Jean Piaget* (1896-1980), in 1960s, to explain the fundamentals of knowledge. The knowledge is, in Piaget regard, a construction between the knower and the cognoscible object, is assimilation and accommodation, concept verified by us years ago, which I entirely agree.

In the military thinking, the constructivism brings somehow the politics and the strategy with the feet on the ground. The knowledge of war isn't just the knowledge of its elements, structures, functions and mechanisms and their use to accomplish some political goals, but the understanding of the complex consequences of military conflict, their transfer in human and society's life, the escalation of arming, conflict and obvious of dangers. A lucid constructivist attitude in the plan of military policies and strategies would have perhaps prevented the reach to the actual stage, when a huge danger – with general nuclear, terrorist and asymmetric dimensions – it profiles more threatening to the tomorrow horizons. Hence, the acute need of realism, even in a century of philosophic and epistemological realism, but of incomprehensible military type confrontations concretized in two hot and destructive world wars and in a cold war – also global -, with the same malfunctions as its predecessors.

The realism is specific for the XX century. Still, it seems the first of the realists was *Aristotle* (384-322 A.D.), because, in order to construct new patterns, he started from the observance results. He is the first saying the verification of all the ideas is impossible. But the intermediary links can't be infinite. When a series finishes, it appears an immediate knowledge of principles. For Aristotle, the principles have double character: they can't be proved, there's no need for demonstration because they are much surely known than all can be deduced

from them. This is the reason the war has principles, even sometimes, in the case of its nonlinear evolutions, comes out of the principles.

The modern realism with Hans Morgenthau as main representative concludes the reports among states are based on power. Therefore, the scientific patterns are part of an objective reality, independent from the observer. This trend doesn't formulate a precise mechanism as the others, of progress in the knowledge field but recognizes the principle of complementarities.

Plank (1859-1947) and *Einstein* (1879-1955) situate among the main representatives of epistemological realism. The recognition of a reality existence toward which all the scientific patterns tend, and are human constructions, differentiates the realism of constructivism.

The constructivism states very determined: the observance (the observer) constructs the reality.

The realism adds with the same determination: the observer is part of reality. It's interesting every of these epistemological trends are part of an era of scientific knowledge and prepares the field for the apparition and manifestation of the next trend without denying itself.

These trends although don't refer expressly to the military scientific thinking, substantially influence also this thinking and materializes in all the range of concepts over war, the violent military action and, generally, the armed action.

The post-modern war – the war of the future generations – will probably be a war getting out from the traditional violence and will pass more and more in the knowledge plan, or, if it won't be like this, it won't probably be at all because we already are in the stage when the level of conflict comes out of rational. Nowadays, the A and H bombs and the other weapons of mass destruction where we also add the systems of weapons of great precision, the geophysical weapons and unconventional weapons, the weapons based on lasers, waves, and

nanotechnologies but also on knowledge etc., creates and maintain, to a level of permanent tension, the danger and even the threat of a war able to rapidly evolve toward an unpredictable and catastrophic chaotic dimension.

In our vision, the post-modern war could become *anti-war war* or *a war to defence the human civilization against its own aggression, and also against other threats as the geophysical, cosmic, informational and the ones coming from the knowledge conflict*. Here comes the epistemology of war that thoroughly studies not only the knowledge of war or the science or the art of war but this phenomenon reason itself.

The post-modern war isn't lesser then its predecessors and its successors. He embraces all possible forms: symmetrical, dissymmetrical and asymmetrical - and doesn't diminish the conflict situation but, on the contrary, incommensurably amplifies, complicates and diversifies it.

In Pavel Tulaev and others regard, the World War III consumed as a cold war. And, it didn't end with a definitive peace but with the World War IV that covers new spaces along with the use of new technologies and by the participation of new subjects.⁶ Tulaev considers as main aggressors the transnational companies, the international banks, and also the organizations of security.

This war goal is to fulfil a new global order and the means are, before everything, the most modern technologies, the information and the network. The aggression against localities and populations is now lead not necessarily by systems of weapons, by attacks and conquests, although neither these aren't excluded, but by ... media. The unstoppable propaganda, acculturation, the products of market culture, films, advertising clips dominate the informational space.

3. Instead of conclusion

⁶ Pavel Tulaev, *Ibidem*, <http://foster.20megsfree.com/326.htm>

It was created the phoney impression that the entire world defends against some dangers and threats coming from obscure areas, from terrorist networks and from the haunted people that starves and from which die of hunger yearly about 45 millions⁷. And, as this tragedy won't be an effect of the battle for power, of some peoples greedy and systematic policies created to bring the populations to poverty and starvation or the effects of some dominative and influencing policies, of control over markets and resources, for the use of less then 10 percents from planet's population.

Without neglecting this very important and real aspect, we consider we haven't the right to elude, into a lucid and fair analysis as it should be any analysis, the other aspects of informational war, media war, and geophysical war, knowledge war that presents as a continuous, intense, stratagem and disproportioned war.

Even if the war is just war, all the other forms of manifestation tend to became autonomous, to co-opt or to centre or concentrate over them the main effort not necessarily to provoke a conflict but, peculiarly, to prevent a conflict and to provide itself a plus of security by power and political and strategic dominance.

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